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The high performance of Dutch and Flemish 15-year-old native pupils: Explaining country 
differences in math scores between highly stratified educational systems1	
 
Tijana Prokic-Breuer & Jaap Dronkers 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to explain the high scores of 15-year-old native pupils in the Netherlands 
and Flanders by comparing them with the scores of pupils in countries with the same highly 
stratified educational system. Therefore, we compare only the educational performance of 
15-year-old pupils from the following regions: the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia, the 
German Länder, the Swiss German cantons, and Austria. We use the data from the general 
Program for International Pupil Assessment (PISA) 2006 together with the specific PISA 
data of Germany and Switzerland also from 2006. We apply a multilevel model that takes 
into account the individual-, curriculum-, and system-level features in these highly stratified 
educational systems. The high scores of the Dutch pupils can be explained by the size of the 
Netherlands’ vocational sector. The high Flemish scores can be only partly explained by the 
high curriculum mobility (as indicated by the lowest level of entrance selection). Central exit 
exams are not a good explanation of the high Dutch scores. Despite being limited to highly 
stratified systems, we still find educational policies and arrangements to have significant 
effects on the educational performance of pupils. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since 2000, 15-year-old pupils living in a large number of Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) member states have been participating in the Program 
for International Pupil Assessment (PISA) every three years. The purpose of this assessment 
is to map competence in mathematics, physics, and reading at the end of the period of 
compulsory education (at the age of 15 or 16 years in most Western countries). Much 
attention was given to the high scores of the Finnish pupils in the three PISA waves, but the 
native pupils in the Netherlands and Flanders also scored quite high in reading and math 
relative to pupils in other European countries. 
The Dutch and Flemish performance particularly stands out when compared to that 
of European countries with very similar educational systems and socioeconomic 
opportunities, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. All these countries have highly 
stratified educational systems with a vocational education tradition (besides general 
education), which already influences the early stages of secondary education. In addition, the 
socioeconomic features of these countries are very similar; therefore the differences in the 
																																																								
1	This research has been financed with the Professor Leune Award, which was bestowed in 2009 on the second author. 
We thank Cedgroep (www.cedgroep.nl), who made this award and prize possible. We also thank Mark Levels for his 
useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. All correspondence should be directed to the second author at 
j.dronkers@maastrichtuniversity.nl.	
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scores cannot be attributed to either system levels or compositional features. Consequently, 
our question is why do these pupils score differently in spite of these sociostructural and 
societal similarities? 
This study aims to answer this and explain the high scores of 15-year-old pupils 
native2 to the Netherlands and Flanders by comparing them with those of the pupils of 
countries with a highly stratified educational system, that is, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Austria.3 This restriction to highly stratified systems and native pupils is deliberate, for we 
are interested in the variation of outcomes and its determinants within the same type of 
system. Unlike previous studies that generally argue that different educational systems 
produce different outcomes (Shavit & Muller, 1998; Kerckhoff, 2001; Hanushek & 
Wössmann, 2005; Horn, 2009; Dunne, 2010), ours examines the differences within highly 
stratified educational systems in terms of both outcomes and determinants. 
A particular feature of the Belgian, German, and Swiss educational systems is that 
their educational policies are fully decentralized. Each of the Belgian regions, German 
Länder, and Swiss cantons enjoys full political independence in their educational affairs. 
This autonomy is an ideal setup for studying the educational outcomes of pupils from the 
Netherlands and Flanders since it increases the number of highly stratified educational 
systems to which these two countries can be compared. 
However, this approach has the hidden risk of producing results that are highly 
politically sensitive. Particularly in Germany, the comparison of the outcomes of the German 
Länder and their determinants is a delicate issue. One of the main raisons for such sensitivity 
is that Germany scores relatively low in cross-country comparisons, while the variation in 
average outcomes is very high across the German Länder. Consequently, the German Länder 
strictly forbids any internal German comparisons with the PISA and the consequences for 
disobeying this restriction are quite severe.4 To avoid such problems, we are forced to limit 
																																																								
2	We limit ourselves in this study to native pupils because educational systems have different outcomes for pupils with a 
migrant background than for native pupils (Dronkers, van der Velden & Dunne, 2012) and because the Dutch PISA 2006 
wave does not have information about the countries of birth of pupils and parents. 
3 We did not include Liechtenstein or Luxemburg in our analysis, although these countries also have a highly stratified 
system, with general and vocational schools. Due to their small size and particular positions, inclusion would have posed 
problems.		
4 The following is an excerpt of the contract we had to sign with the German educational authorities—represented by the 
Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen (IQB)—to be granted access to so-called PISA+ data: 
Data access is granted on condition that no German federal states are named or made identifiable – 
intentionally or unintentionally – in any publication of the research results. Furthermore, it is the 
responsibility of the data recipient to ensure that no German federal state can be identified through the 
combination of any parameters or features published with the research results…. For every case of non-
compliance with his obligations set out in sentence 1, the data recipient shall pay the FDZ 
[Forschungsdatenzentrum] a contractual penalty of up to 10.000 € (ten thousand Euros). The right of the FDZ 
to claim further damages in the event of a higher amount of loss caused by the data recipient's offence 
remains unaffected. 
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our analysis and not explore existing differences between identifiable German Länder.5 
Nevertheless, this is the first time this particular comparative setup has been used to explain 
the high scores of the Netherlands and Flanders. 
Our approach to the question can be outlined as follows. We present the theoretical 
framework from which our hypotheses are derived. Next we outline the multilevel model 
with which we analyze the data. This model contains three levels (pupils, curricula, and 
systems) instead of the usual two levels approach (pupils and systems). Therefore we give 
this three-level model more attention. We then present the data and our analysis. The final 
section discusses the wider interpretation and consequences of our results, not only for the 
Netherlands and Flanders but also for countries with highly stratified educational systems 
(including Germany). 
 
2. Differences in performance between educational systems: The trade-off between 
equity and efficiency 
Only since recently have scholars agreed that the educational outcomes of pupils in different 
educational systems vary systematically. Pupils in comprehensive educational systems have, 
on average, higher scores than equivalent pupils in highly stratified educational systems, 
where the selection of students into different secondary education curricula takes place at a 
very early age (Shavit & Muller, 1998; Kerckhoff, 2001; Hanushek & Wössmann, 2005; 
Horn, 2009; Dunne, 2010). 
The literature puts forward several arguments to explain this disparity. The degree of 
stratification of the educational system, measured by the degree of tracking, is directly 
related to a perceived trade-off between the equity and efficiency of educational 
achievement. Typically, highly stratified systems perform better in terms of efficiency and 
worse in terms of equity compared to comprehensive systems; however, the gain in 
efficiency is smaller than the loss in equity. In highly stratified education systems, where 
homogeneous classrooms permit a focused curriculum and appropriately paced instruction, 
maximizing learning within a track, the pupils in the lowest tracks will be systematically 
disadvantaged by slower learning environments that leave them behind those in the upper 
tracks in terms of skills. 
																																																								
5 This restriction on any internal German comparison of the educational performance of the Länder also applies to the 
NEPS data (National Educational Panel Study), the only educational data available at the German federal level (see 
http://www.neps-data.de/en-us/home.aspx). 
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Another explanation for the lower performance of pupils in highly stratified systems 
is the presence of so-called nonlinear peer effects. The diverse learning environment may 
benefit lower-ability students (in terms of higher motivation, exposure to better class 
discussion, etc.) without disadvantaging higher-ability students (Wössmann, 2003). 
In sum, highly stratified systems have a high degree of efficiency from promoting 
more tailor-made learning; however, they produce lower overall equity by disadvantaging 
the students in the lowest tracks. The opposite is true for comprehensive systems. 
In the production of lower or higher efficiency and equity schools play an important 
role as the mediating features between the systems and pupils. School characteristics, being 
a measure of educational environment, transmit educational system features into constraints 
and opportunities for pupils to learn and for teachers to teach. School features are the 
consequences of both the level of stratification of educational systems and the choices made 
in the design of any educational system, independently of its stratification level. For 
instance, differences in school socioeconomic composition exist in comprehensive 
educational systems (as a consequence of spatial segregation and school catchment areas) 
and these differences can be larger in highly stratified systems because of the selection of 
pupils with different scholastic abilities (related to their social background) into schools with 
different levels of curricula. However, if a more challenging curriculum level is taught in 
some schools within a highly stratified system, this can lead to the higher educational 
performance of the pupils in these schools. However, less able pupils will be selected into 
schools with less challenging curricula and their performance may be lower as well. 
Analogously, if only the average level of curriculum is taught in all schools within a 
comprehensive system, the more able pupils will be less challenged and thus may have a 
lower educational performance, while the less able students will be more challenged and 
thus have a higher performance. System and school features can thus form configurations 
that may be more or less of an advantage in the educational performance of pupils of 
different socioeconomic backgrounds attending schools with different compositions and 
offering different levels of curricula. 
Dunne (2010) showed empirically that school characteristics have substantially 
different effects on and implications for educational achievement in different educational 
systems. These authors found that school composition matters: Pupils in schools of low 
socioeconomic composition in comprehensive systems have higher educational performance 
than those in comparable schools of low socioeconomic composition in highly stratified 
education systems, possibly because pupils within comprehensive systems are taught a more 
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challenging, average curriculum, while a less challenging, below-average curriculum is 
taught in schools within highly stratified systems. These differential effects of school 
composition in different educational systems may be explained by the selection of less or 
more able pupils into different school types (and thus different school compositions) in 
highly stratified systems, while such a selection of less or more able pupils into different 
schools does not exist in a comprehensive system (although these schools may still have a 
different composition due to spatial segregation). 
In a follow-up study, Dronkers, van der Velden, and Dunne (2011) added curriculum 
level to their analysis of the effect of educational systems. The authors concluded that the 
inclusion of the curriculum level is necessary to avoid overestimation of the school 
composition effect. Especially in stratified educational systems such as those of the 
Netherlands and Germany, different tracks may be nested within the same school, such that 
the direct learning environment of pupils is better approximated by curriculum 
characteristics than school characteristics. But the addition of curriculum level did not alter 
the earlier conclusion that school characteristics have substantially different effects and 
implications in different educational systems regarding educational achievement. 
Given that this study focuses only on a group of highly stratified educational 
systems, we start with the naïve assumption that individual socioeconomic outcomes or 
school features do not have significantly different educational returns across these countries 
because they all have the same educational system. If this is the case, then the next logical 
question is what other factors can explain these differences? This article’s main argument is 
that there are important differences between highly stratified educational systems that can be 
used to explain the success of the Dutch and Flemish educational systems and thus the 
differences in achievement between the German Länder and the Swiss cantons. The next 
section outlines the main argument and put forward the hypothesis to be tested. 
 
3. Systematic differences within highly stratified systems 
There are three important features in which highly stratified educational systems can differ: 
1) the standardization of the system by the existence of a central final exam, 2) the system’s 
vocational orientation, and 3) the selection of pupils into different tracks at the start of 
secondary schooling and the level of their mobility between these tracks during secondary 
education. Interestingly, the current literature has devoted some attention to the relevance of 
these features, but they are often confused with the degree of stratification of the educational 
system (Shavit & Muller, 1998; Kerckhoff, 2001; Hanushek & Wössmann, 2005; Horn, 
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2009; Dunne, 2010). This omission risks overlooking the independent role these features 
have on the effects of the stratification of the educational system on individual achievement. 
 These three aspects varies between highly stratified systems and may consequently 
alter the trade-off differentiated educational systems face between equity and efficiency. 
Moreover, there is a reason to believe that these features can either 1) improve equity 
without reducing efficiency or 2) improve efficiency without decreasing equity in highly 
stratified educational systems. Essentially, the trade-off between equity and efficiency 
centers around the questions of which and how many pupils gain or lose in a particular 
educational system. The average outcome within each system reflects the net overall gain or 
loss in the educational performance of average pupils. Given that the average lower 
performance of the highly stratified system is a combination of the lower performance of the 
larger numbers of students in the lower tracks and the higher performance of the smaller 
numbers of students in the higher tracks, the way grouping of students in tracks occur within 
highly stratified systems becomes of critical importance in the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. 
  This finding implies that the overall performance of students can be improved in two 
ways: 1) by decreasing selectivity and allowing more students to enter the highest track, 
which would increase the performance of middle track students because of the nonlinear 
peer effect, and 2) by increasing the educational focus of the lower tracks and attracting 
more able students to them. Vocational orientation increases the labor market focus of an 
educational system, particularly for students of the lowest tracks. Successful 
vocationalization of the lower tracks promotes efficient learning and employability and these 
tracks offer an attractive alternative to general education. Therefore, in terms of 
employability, we expect the quality and attractiveness of a vocational orientation to be 
directly related to the performance of pupils within the lowest tracks. 
 While the change in the relative sizes of the tracks increases with equity, it is 
standardization of the educational system that brings about gains in overall performance 
through higher efficiency in all tracks. The existence of a final central exam is believed to 
reduce variability between schools of the same type and level. By introducing an external 
standard, student performance is comparable across classes and schools and levels of 
educational quality are rendered observable and transparent. This improves the external 
monitoring of teachers, schools, and pupil performance. By setting such standards, a central 
examination promotes more equal opportunities and efficient learning through three different 
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channels: increasing external rewards for learning, decreasing peer pressure against learning, 
and increasing the monitoring of teachers and schools (Wössmann, 2003). 
 Our assumption is that the success of the Dutch and Flemish educational systems is 
best explained by successful implementation of the above-mentioned features. Table 2 
shows that Netherlands and Flanders indeed stand out when compared to other countries 
regarding the degree of standardization, vocationalization, or mobility of their educational 
systems. Although the Netherlands score high on standardization and vocationalization, 
Flanders has the lowest level of entrance selection. The Netherlands has the highest score for 
the indicator central exit exam (average 0.3 in Table 1) and exceptionally prominent 
vocational education. Compared to other educational systems, that of the Netherlands has an 
exceptionally large vocational sector (53.3% compared to an average of 22.0%; see Table 1). 
 The Flemish educational system has a relatively open admission to each curriculum 
level of secondary school, but a high level of internal (downward) curriculum mobility (the 
“cascade model”) as well (Boone & Van Houtte, 2013). Table 2 shows that Flanders has a 
relatively low score on high selection entrance (0.15 compared to an average of 0.30; see 
Table 1) and a relatively high score on low entrance selection (0.31 compared to an average 
of 0.21; see Table 1). This may be a reflection of their unique cascade model, with a low 
level of entrance selection but a high level of internal downward mobility. Consequently, we 
formulate our two main hypotheses as follows. 
 1. The high scores of the Dutch pupils can be explained by a successful combination of 
vocationalization and standardization. We expect the Dutch educational system to be more 
successful at enhancing competition between schools and promoting efficient learning than 
other highly stratified educational systems because of the high level of parental school 
choice in the Netherlands (Netherlands has, together with Flanders, the highest percentage of 
pupils in private dependent schools, 69%, compared to an average of 42%). In the case of 
the Netherlands, competition is achieved by a combination of setting external standards for 
the quality of schooling (a final central test at the end of primary school and a final central 
examination for all types of secondary education) and maintaining an attractive and 
substantial vocational education. If this is true, then the Dutch educational system is more 
successful at reducing the lower performance of the less successful students (through 
vocationalization) than other highly stratified educational systems while increasing the 
efficiency of the system as a whole (through standardization). 
 2. Low selectivity (as indicated by low entrance selection) can explain the high scores 
of the Flemish pupils. We expect the Flemish educational system to promote equality among 
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its students without reducing its efficiency by placing a higher proportion of them in a higher 
track at the start of their secondary education at age 12. A unique feature of the Flemish 
system is that due to low selectivity, a majority of the students are allowed to enter the 
highest educational track. However, unlike for comprehensive systems, the existence of the 
lowest tracks ensures the possibility of downward mobility during secondary education. We 
argue that next to equity benefits related to the bigger size of the highest tracks, the 
motivation of students to stay in the highest track is higher than the motivation to exit from 
the lowest track; therefore the educational performance of all pupils can be increased. 
 
4. Data, variables, and methodology 
Since 2000, the OECD has conducted large-scale tri-annual tests among 15-year-olds living 
in its member states and partner states to assess pupils’ mathematical, reading, and scientific 
literacy, resulting in the PISA data. The purpose of this test is to map competence in 
mathematics, physics, and reading at the end of the period of compulsory education (the age 
of 15 or 16 in most Western countries). We make use of the 2006 wave for the Netherlands, 
Belgium, German Länder, and the Swiss German cantons. The PISA 2006 data of the Swiss 
German cantons were purchased from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (EDK).6 The PISA 
2006 data of the German Länder were obtained from the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im 
Bildungswesen (IQB) of the Humboldt University (Berlin). These additional and extended 
2006 German PISA data were collected by the Max-Planck-Institut für 
Bildingsforschung/IPN Kiel/the KMK. The PISA data for Austria, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands were obtained from the PISA webpage. Belgium pupils are divided into Flemish 
and Walloon pupils based on the teaching language of their school.7  
The PISA data for each participating country constitute a representative sample of the 
schools that teach 15-year-old pupils. We select only native-born pupils from these datasets, 
using the PISA definition of immigrant pupil.8 Each school that has been selected tests a 
sample of all 15-year-olds, irrespective of their curriculum or grade. In addition to 
educational performance, PISA also supplies information on a large number of individual 
background and school characteristics. The school principals provide details on a variety of 
school characteristics such as pupil–teacher ratio, teacher shortages, and school location. The 
																																																								
6 Swiss dataset of the IX-grade students, PISA 2006, – Federal Statistical Office (EDK). 
7 Schools in Brussels are thus divided into Flemish and Walloon schools. 
8 The student and/or both parents were born outside the test country.	
  9
pupils’ questionnaires request information on such things as the educational level of their 
parents. Table 1 gives the summary statistics of all the variables. 
 
[About here table 1] 
 
4.1. Combination of schools and curricula as an indicator of school level 
The PISA data contain two cross-national indicators of the pupil curriculum. The pupil is 
asked whether he or she is currently enrolled in a certain curriculum of a certain level. This is 
later recoded in an internationally comparable format, distinguishing between general and 
vocational curricula, on the one hand, and between lower and higher curricula, on the other. 
Schools are the sampling units in the PISA survey but can contain both general and 
vocational education. In addition, different definitions of a school are applied in different 
countries. Whereas in some, such as the Netherlands a school is defined as an 
“administrational unit”, in others, such as Germany, it is defined as a “location”. Therefore, 
we assume that the curriculum-level characteristics within these schools reflect more 
precisely the level of the daily teaching and learning environment than the administrative 
unit of a school. We call this combination of schools and curricula the curriculum level. We 
compute the indicator of the curriculum level for each pupil by combining his or her school 
identification number, the kind of curriculum he or she is following (vocational or general), 
and the curriculum level (low, medium, or high). 
While focusing on highly stratified educational systems, this study also includes both 
school and curriculum features. Indeed, school and curriculum characteristics are not 
independent of the educational systems in which they operate but, rather, heavily conditioned 
by them. Therefore our analysis has three-levels: educational systems (either the unitary state 
or the cantons, Länder, or language community), curricula as a measure of learning 
environments and educational goals, and pupils with different social and cultural 
backgrounds and learning histories.9 
 
4.2. Dependent variable: Math performance 
The dependent variable in this study is math performance. To measure math skills accurately 
would make the test too long to be feasible. Hence a large number of very similar but shorter 
tests were created. Since such different tests can never have exactly the same degree of 
																																																								
9 We also added a fourth highest level for the five national states without any explanatory variable (see Section 5). 
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difficulty, item response modeling was used to achieve comparable results between pupils 
who took different tests. Our analysis averages the five plausible values obtained from the 
item response modeling. The math skills scores are standardized for the OECD countries, 
using an average of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Table 2 shows the average scores 
and standard deviations of the reading and math scores by country, Belgium language 
community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder.10 
 
[About here table 2] 
 
4.3. Individual-level variables of all pupils 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. 
4.3.1. Parental ESCS. The index of the economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS) of 
the parents is a composite index created in the PISA dataset of the occupational status of the 
parents measured with the International Socio-economic Index for Occupational Status 
(ISEI) scale (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, Treiman & De Leeuw, 1992), the educational level of 
the parents measured with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED;  
UNESCO, 2006), and the presence of any material or cultural resources at the pupils’ 
homes.11 This combination of the parents’ occupational status and educational level together 
with the resources at home produces the strongest indicator of the parental environment. We 
set the average of the parental ESCS for each destination country to zero to ensure that the 
comparisons for this item show the result for the average pupil in these countries. 
4.3.2. Grade. We have included a variable to account for the fact that not all pupils 
attend the same grade. As a result of between-country variance in the way grades are 
constructed, we have standardized the grade around a country’s modal grade. 
4.3.3. Female. We control for gender effects by using a dummy variable indicating 
whether a pupil is female (one) or male (zero). 
 
																																																								
10	Comparable detailed information about the averages of the Länder has already been published by Köller, Knigge, and Tesch 
(2010). However, according to the contract (see footnote 3), we are not allowed to publish comparable detailed information. 
Therefore we grouped the Länder into five categories, but only for this table, not in the analysis.	
11 The measure consists of the presence of a desk, a private room, a quiet place to study, a computer, educational software, 
Internet access, literature or poetry, art, books that may be of use in schoolwork, a dictionary, a dishwasher, and the presence 
of more than 100 books in the house. 
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4.4. Variables measured at the curriculum level 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. 
4.4.1. Levels of curriculum. We distinguish between three curriculum levels: 1) Lower 
vocational curriculum, a dummy indicating whether a pupil is currently enrolled in lower 
vocational type of education (ISCED classification); 2) Medium, a dummy indicating 
whether a pupil is currently enrolled in a higher vocational or lower general type of 
education, and 3) High, a dummy indicating whether a pupil is enrolled in the highest level 
of general education, giving entrance rights to university education. In addition, we use these 
dummies as our indicators of curriculum levels to compute school composition features. 
More information on these curriculum levels are in Appendix I.12 
4.4.2. Socioeconomic school diversity. Similarly, we calculate the sociocultural diversity 
at the curriculum level. Using the ESCS scores of the parents, we divide these parental 
scores into five categories: the group with the lowest 10% of scores, the 10–30% group, the 
30–70% group, the 70–90% group, and the group with the highest 10% of scores.13 On the 
basis of these five categories, we calculate the Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity 
(varying between zero and one).14 The index should be interpreted as follows: A value of 
zero means there is no diversity because all parents of all pupils at that particular curriculum 
level are in the same ESCS category. A value approaching one indicates a very high level of 
diversity, where pupils are equally recruited from the five ESCS categories. Since this 
Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity is “level blind” and therefore insensitive to the 
average parental educational level, we added the average ESCS of the curriculum level to the 
analysis. 
4.4.3. Percentage of native pupils. The Dutch PISA data 2006 do not contain the country 
of birth of the pupils and parents because the Dutch Minister of Education did not want to 
know that important variable (Dronkers, 2005). Therefore we cannot distinguish between 
immigrants from different origin countries. In this case the omission is less serious than in an 
OECD-wide comparison, because the countries of origin of the immigrants in Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands are more or less comparable (see Appendix C of 
																																																								
12	Note that the construction of these three dummies deviates from the approach of Dronkers, van der Velden & 
Dunne (2011), who divide the Medium category into a vocational and a general type.	
13 The groups are defined as follows: 1) less than 10%, ESCS < -1.1; 20 10–30%, -1.0 < ESCS < -0.4; 3) 30–70%, -0.3 < 
ESCS < 0.6; 4) 70–90%, 0.7 < ESCS < 1.2; 5) more than 90%, ESCS > 1.3. 
14 The Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity is calculated as follows: 1 - ((percentage of parents from ESCS group 1) 2 
+ (percentage of parents from ESCS group 2) 2 + … + (percentage of parents from ESCS group 5) 2).  
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Dronkers, van der Velden & Dunne, 2011). However, the percentage of native pupils in each 
of these educational systems does vary and needs to be included in our analysis. 
4.4.4. Average ESCS. We calculate the average parental ESCS per curriculum level as 
the best indicator of school socioeconomic composition. 
 
4.5.Variables measured at the school level 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. We use 
these school-level indicators as curriculum-level indicators. 
4.5.1. Selective admittance. Selective admittance of pupils to a school is a scale in the 
PISA data based on the answers of the principals indicating whether admittance to their 
schools is based on academic record and/or recommendations. We divide the scale into three 
dummies: high selection, medium selection (reference category), and low selection. 
4.5.2. Urbanization. Two dummies were constructed to indicate whether a school is 
located in (large) city or a rural area. Schools in an urbanized countryside or a (small) town 
serve as the reference category. 
4.5.3. School size. School size is the number of pupils in the school, based on the 
answers of the principals. 
4.5.4. Private/public. Educational systems differ in the shares of public and private 
schools and the degree of state grants for these private schools. Two dummies are 
constructed to separate private state dependent and private state independent schools from 
public schools. These variables control for these system differences and the effectiveness of 
these school types (Dronkers & Robert, 2008; Dronkers & Avram, 2010a, 2010b). 
 
4.6. Variables measured at the educational system level 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. 
4.6.1. Central exit examination. This standardization variable refers to the degree to 
which clear external standards or incentives exist in an educational system to maintain the 
quality level of the education it provides. This variable indicates the extent to which 
educational systems have a set of standard rules and guidelines education should follow 
(Wössmann, 2003). An example of a clear external standard is conducting nationally 
standardized exams at the end of secondary education. Therefore, we have constructed the 
dummy variable central exit examination, which takes value one if there is a standardized 
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central exit exam at the end of high school in the educational system. This dummy takes the 
value zero if there is none. 
4.6.2. Percentage of pupils enrolled in a lower vocational curriculum. Studies  (Shavit 
& Blossfeld, 1995) have shown that an educational system’s vocational orientation increases 
its labor market focus. This can reduce (vocational education as a dead-end street) or 
enhance (vocational education as a safety net) equality and promote efficient learning. We 
control for this vocationalization of each educational system by looking at the percentage of 
the total number of pupils enrolled in the lower vocational curriculum. We derive this 
percentage by aggregating the percentage of pupils in lower vocational education by country, 
region, Land, or canton. 
4.6.3. Socioeconomic gradient. This variable depicts the relation between the 
educational achievement and socioeconomic background of the pupils in each separate 
educational system. The gradient by country, region, Land, or canton is derived from the 
coefficient of the ESCS after controlling for the individual characteristics of gender and 
grade (Appendix II, model 2, but separately by country, region, Land, or canton). A high 
score of this socioeconomic gradient means that the effect of parental background on 
educational performance is strong in that country, region, Land, or canton.15 
4.6.4. First age of selection of pupils. This age varies only between 10 and 12 years 
within highly stratified systems. 
 
4.7. The Model 
We use multilevel modeling for the purpose of our empirical analysis because our data are 
hierarchically clustered in groups. Therefore the data violate the conditional independence 
assumption about error terms from the classical linear regression model. This multilevel 
analysis has four hierarchical levels: the national state, educational systems, curriculum 
levels, and the pupils. In a number of cases the multilevel solution did not converge. We 
indicate such a non-convergence in Tables 4 and 5. In these cases we applied a three-level 
model (educational systems, curriculum levels, and pupils).16 
																																																								
15 Controlling for grade can lead to an underestimation of the socioeconomic gradient of a country, region, Land, or canton if 
repeating or skipping classes in a country is more dependent on socioeconomic background than in the other countries. Given 
the similarities of the highly stratified systems analyzed, substantial cross-country variation in the relation between repeating 
or skipping classes and socioeconomic background is unlikely. 
16 The non-convergence of some four-level models may be due to the limitation of the general program STATA, which we 
we had to use to analyze the German data in the IQB building. The MlWin program, specialized in multilevel analysis, 
converges with no problem in situations where STATA does not converge but we were not allowed to use our laptops with 
MlWin for this analysis in the IQB building. 
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We divide the observations into five different groups at the national state level according 
to the national state to which a student belongs: Austria, Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, or Switzerland. We have added this national state level to capture the possible 
effect of a specific national state on educational performance, besides the features of the 
different educational systems within these states. Note that in all models this national state 
level contains significant unexplained variance. Only for Austria and the Netherlands is there 
no variation at the educational system level, because both countries are unitary states with 
regard to education. The dummy for the Netherlands is thus situated at the national state 
level, with only five cases. The dummy for Flanders is situated at the educational system 
level, with 26 cases. School characteristics are transferred to the curriculum level to make the 
multilevel analysis manageable. The advantage of multilevel modeling for the purpose of our 
analysis is that it allows for a direct estimation of the importance of these different levels in 
the causal process. 
 
5. Analyses 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for all relevant individual, school, and system 
variables for the different educational systems of the countries, regions, cantons and groups 
of Länder, separately. Table 3 shows the differences in the average level of ESCS for each 
level of curriculum.17 As we can see from these tables, although these educational systems 
are all highly stratified, with a strong tradition in vocational training, there are considerable 
differences between them regarding the average ESCS at the individual and curriculum 
levels. Moreover, the systems differ in the socioeconomic segregation of pupils at different 
levels. 
 
[Table 3, about here] 
 
We conducted a series of multilevel analyses for math scores. The full results are given in 
the Appendices II to V. Model 1 includes only dummies for the Netherlands and Flanders 
and thus gives the degree to which the scores of Dutch and Flemish pupils are higher than 
the average scores of pupils from Austria, the German Länder, the Swiss German cantons, 
																																																								
17 Because of the restrictions in the contract with IQB, we are not allowed to identify the Länder in Table 3. Therefore we 
averaged the values for all the German Länder into five groups. This grouping of Länder is not used in the multilevel 
analyses, where we use the Länder separately.  
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and Wallonia. 18  Model 2 includes the Dutch and Flemish dummies and the individual 
characteristics. 
 
[About here table 4] 
 
Models 3 to 6 include the curriculum-level features separately, while model 7 contains 
controls for both individual and all curriculum features together. We summarize the 
coefficients for Flanders and the Netherlands from the multilevel equations in Table 4 and 
Appendix II gives all the coefficients of these seven models. Table 5 shows all the 
coefficients of model 7. 
The next step in our series of multilevel analyses includes features of the educational 
systems. At this level we control for the existence of central exams, the size of vocational 
education, age of first selection, and the socioeconomic gradient. Each of these educational 
system features is combined with only individual-level features of model 2 in models 8 to 
11. The coefficients of these four models are given in Appendix III. The results in Appendix 
IV (models 12 to 15) shows the same equations but with entrance selection as an additional 
control. The effects for the dummies for the Netherlands and Flanders in these models are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
[About here table 5] 
 
With models 16 to 23, we combine educational system features in the equations together 
with individual characteristics and different combinations of curriculum-level features. We 
present these various models and combinations to make our results as transparent as 
possible. All the coefficients of these models are given in Appendix V. 
 
																																																								
18 However, there is some uncertainty about the interpretation of the results obtained for the dummy for Netherlands. Given 
that multilevel modeling, just as normal ordinary least squares regression, requires a minimum number of observations at 
each level, we can question if this condition is met in the case of the Netherlands. At the highest level of our model (the 
nation state), where the Netherlands is, we have only five cases in which 26 educational systems are clustered. At the level 
of educational system, where Flanders is, we have 26 cases in which many schools are clustered. Because of the very low 
number of groups at the highest level, the meaning of the insignificance of any variable at this level can be questioned. 
Statistically, it may be that such insignificance occurs because of the low number of cases at that level and not because the 
coefficient is not substantive. On the other hand, we can be certain about significant effects found at this level because of 
the low likelihood of obtaining significant effects with fewer groups at each given level. Therefore, in the explanation of our 
results in the following sections, we will also take into consideration the size of the effect for the Dutch dummy, even if, 
strictly speaking, this should not be considered. However, the Dutch dummy is neither significant in a three level analysis. 
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6. Results 
6.1. Explanations of the high scores of the Dutch and Flemish pupils 
The main aim of this study is to determine why the pupils in the Netherlands and Flanders 
perform better in international educational comparisons than those in countries with very 
similar socioeconomic as well as educational system features. Our main argument is that in 
the Dutch case this success is achieved through vocationalization and standardization, and in 
the Flemish case through the insurance of low selection into the higher tracks. 
We find mixed support for our first hypothesis on the success of the Dutch 
educational system, that is, the high scores of the Dutch pupils can be explained by a 
successful combination of vocationalization and standardization. When it comes to the role 
of the standardization of the Dutch educational system, we observe that the strength of the 
Netherlands dummy is only a bit lower 19  in model 8 (including individual and exam 
variables) than in model 2 (including only individual variables). However, the Netherlands 
dummy and the effect of the central exit exam variable are both insignificant in the final 
model 24. This means that the existence of a central examination is not a good empirical 
explanation of the high scores of the Dutch pupils. 
We do find that the size of the vocational sector can explain the high scores of the 
Dutch pupils. The strength of the Netherlands dummy is only a bit lower20 in model 11 
(individual variables and percentage vocational education) than in model 2 (only individual 
variables). But the effect of the percentage vocational education is positive and significant in 
the final model 24 (a 10% larger vocational sector give 11.4  points higher on the math test), 
while the Netherlands dummy is insignificant and small (15 points) and thus the percentage 
vocational education can explain the high Dutch math scores. The interim results from 
Appendices IV (model 15) and V (model 23) suggest that this positive effect of percentage 
vocational education becomes only significant after the inclusion of other controls (e.g., 
entrance selection, the curriculum level). 
Moreover, Table 3 shows a related aspect of the size of the vocational sector: The 
average socioeconomic composition of Dutch vocational schools is relatively high compared 
to other educational systems; only the vocational schools in the Swiss canton Aargau have 
an even better socioeconomic composition. That might explain why in model 2, after the 
inclusion of the parental ESCS, the Netherlands dummy already becomes insignificant. 
Because the Dutch vocational sector both is among the largest of the compared systems and 
																																																								
19	A	value	of	29 points versus 39 points on the math test.	
20	A	value	of	30 points versus 39 points on the math test.	
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has the best socioeconomic composition of the lowest vocational sector, the Netherlands 
dummy already becomes small in model 5 (where we do not control for percentage 
vocational education or attending a vocational curriculum but already control for the 
socioeconomic background of the pupils). 
 Our second hypothesis, which assumes that the low entrance selection can explain the 
high scores of the Flemish pupils, is supported by our results. The Flemish dummy in model 
4, with the inclusion of the variable entrance selection, becomes insignificant and smaller.21 
The Flanders dummy is also insignificant in models 12 to 15 (Appendix IV), which have 
entrance selection as a control. As said earlier, Flanders has a relatively low score on high 
entrance selection and a relatively high score on low entrance selection. This may reflect 
their unique cascade model in secondary schools, with a low level of entrance selection but a 
high level of internal downward mobility (Boone & Van Houtte, 2013). 
 
6.2. The difference that vocational orientation, standardization, and low entrance 
selection make 
A low level of entrance selection still has a negative effect on educational performance 
(-3.6), while a high level of entrance selection has a positive effect (7.8). It may be that, 
despite all the controls, these effects still reflect some unmeasured variance between the 
pupils who have passed these various levels of entrance selection. But a more plausible 
explanation is that a school’s level of entrance selection indicates its ambition and quality, 
which influence the performance of its pupils. 
We do not find a positive effect on educational performance for a highly stratified 
system with central exit exams. As long as we do not control for the curriculum level, a 
central exit exam has a positive effect on math scores of around 12 points (model 8 or 16). It 
may be that within highly stratified educational systems, curricula and exit exams have the 
same function: setting standards for teachers and pupils. A curriculum may fulfill this 
function better and make the additional effect of a central exit exam insignificant. 
Age of selection in a highly stratified system still has a positive effect on educational 
performance, despite all the controls. Given that the range of this age among these highly 
stratified educational systems runs between 10 and 12 and the German Länder apply in most 
cases 10 years, the two-year difference with Flanders, the Netherlands, and most Swiss 
German cantons gives German and Austrian pupils a 22.2 lower average math score. 
																																																								
21	A	value	of	25	points	(model	4)	versus	39	points	(model	2).	
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The size of the vocational sector of a highly stratified system has a positive effect on the 
math scores of all pupils. Given the negative effect of attending a lower vocational track 
(-56.8), the arrear of these 57 points is bridged if the size of the vocational sector is equal to 
50%.22 However, the scores of pupils in the medium and high curricula increase at the same 
pace with a larger vocational sector and thus these scores also increase by 57 points. This 
can be explained by the higher selectivity of the schools offering medium and high curricula 
if they receive lower percentages of less-able pupils due to the larger size of the vocational 
sector. 
 
6.3. Other results 
It should be noted that these results are also relevant for the individual German Länder 
because they are separately included in the multilevel analyses and not as the combinations 
presented in Tables 2 and 3. We expect that these results would not be different if we could 
openly compare these Länder, as we have done with Flanders and the Netherlands. 
The parental socioeconomic background has its usual significant effect (7.5), but the 
strength of the average ESCS school composition (which uses the same index and has more 
or less the same range; see Table 1) in the final model 24 is three times higher (26.3). 
Attending a school with a high socioeconomic composition remains important for 
educational performance, despite the fact that we control for the curriculum level, a 
parameter as substantial as school composition (lower vocational track -56.8, high 55.0). 
Taking into account school curriculum level is thus also important in understanding the 
educational performance of pupils, but the attended curriculum level does not fully explain 
the effect of parental ESCS or the average ESCS school composition. 
In view of the many policy debates about the benefits of ESCS school diversity for 
educational performance (as part of the debate on the need to change toward a more 
comprehensive educational system), it is remarkable that there is no significant effect of 
ESCS school diversity after controlling for curriculum level. It may be possible that ESCS 
school diversity is erroneously mixed up with the curriculum level and that the level effect is 
wrongly attributed to school diversity. It should be noted, however, that ethnic school 
diversity has a negative effect on the educational performance of migrant pupils, even after 
all possible controls (Dronkers & van der Velden, 2012). But this negative effect is contrary 
to the assumed positive effect of diversity. 
																																																								
22	Here	56.84	(attending	a	lower	vocational	stream)/1.139	(size	of	vocational	sector).	
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The percentage of native pupils in schools has a positive effect on the educational 
performance of native pupils (10% more native pupils is related with 1.5 points more at the 
math test), despite all controls for ESCS, school composition, curriculum level, urban living, 
private schools, and so forth. A possible explanation is that a higher percentage of non-
native pupils is a larger challenge for the teacher and thus decreases the real teaching and 
learning time for native pupils as well. 
Pupils in private dependent schools still have, despite all controls, higher scores (by 3.2 
points), while pupils in private independent schools have lower scores (by -18.5 points) than 
comparable pupils in comparable public schools. This is in line with earlier research 
(Dronkers & Robert, 2008; Dronkers & Avram, 2010a, 2010b), which found the same 
effects for these countries with highly stratified educational systems. 
A large school size promotes the educational performance of its pupils (100 more pupils 
means a 2.5-point higher score). This result runs against lay wisdom that small schools are 
better for children but supports the general line of research. However, the negative effect of 
the school size squared variable indicates that this positive effect levels off and becomes 
negative for secondary schools larger than 4016 pupils. 
Finally, the variance in a model with only the Netherlands and Flanders dummies 
(model 1, Table 5) can be divided between four hierarchical levels: the national state, 
educational systems, curricula, and pupils. The variances at these levels are as follows in 
model 1: 447 (5.5%), 87 (1.1%), 4132 (51.2%), and 3407 (42.2%). Our multilevel models 
can explain substantial parts of these variances, but the left variances of model 24 show that 
significant variances remain unexplained at each level—126 (3.3%), 130 (3.5%), 689 
(18.4%), and 2809 (74.8%). This means that the observed educational system, school, and 
pupil characteristics decrease the unexplained variance at the national state level by 72% (1 -
 126/447), at the school level by 83% (1 - 689/4132), and at the pupil level by 18% (1 - 
2809/3407). However, these characteristics increase the unexplained variance at the 
educational system level by 33% (87/130). This means that these differences in these 
characteristics between the analyzed systems decrease the differences in the added value of 
the educational systems of the different countries, regions, cantons, and Länder. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The main aim of this article is to explain the high scores of 15-year-old pupils in the 
Netherlands and Flanders by comparing them with those of pupils in countries with similar 
highly stratified educational systems. Moreover, we examine if individual-, curriculum-, and 
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educational system-level features play different roles for educational achievement in highly 
stratified educational systems with general and vocational training. To this end, we compare 
the educational performance of 15-year-old pupils from the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia, 
the German Länder, the Swiss German cantons, and Austria. 
We used multilevel modeling for the purpose of our empirical analysis because our data 
are hierarchically clustered in groups. Our multilevel analysis has four hierarchical levels: 
the national state, educational systems, curricula, and pupils. Different from previous studies 
about the effects of educational systems, we use curriculum level as the school level. We do 
so because it allows us to include the level of the curriculum taught in the analyses. We thus 
avoid overestimating the school composition effect, especially in stratified educational 
systems, or misspecifying the effects of the features of educational systems. 
 
7.1. Explanation of the high Flemish and Dutch scores 
The high scores of the Dutch pupils can be explained by the size of the Netherlands’ 
vocational sector (first hypothesis). We find that the larger the vocational sector of a highly 
stratified system, the better all pupils within that educational system perform. The 
Netherlands has the largest vocational sector of all educational systems compared in this 
analysis. A large vocational sector may increase the labor market focus of an educational 
system and thus promote efficient learning by pupils through a more focused curriculum and 
teaching. Consequently, after the inclusion of this size of the vocational sector in the 
analysis, the scores of the Dutch pupils were the same as those for the other countries with 
highly stratified systems. The policy drive toward the generalization of the content of 
secondary education since 1968 (in an attempt to lower educational inequality) has 
threatened to make vocational education a dead-end street with a very low socioeconomic 
composition. Relative to policy makers in other highly stratified systems (such as Aargau, 
the German city-Länder, the northwestern and eastern German Länder, and Wallonia), the 
Dutch policy makers were unsuccessful in this policy drive and we contribute the high 
scores of all Dutch pupils to the large Dutch vocational sector. 
Central exit exams are not an independent explanation of the high scores of Dutch 
pupils (first hypothesis). The curriculum may sett the standards for teachers and pupils better 
within a highly stratified system than a central exam can. 
The high Flemish scores can be partly explained by the high curriculum mobility (as 
indicated by the highest level of medium entrance selection). The Flemish educational 
system has relatively open entrance at each curriculum level in secondary school, but a high 
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level of internal (downward) curriculum mobility (“cascade model”) as well. The “not too 
high but not too low” level of entrance selection (trying to combine the best of two 
solutions) and the high level of curriculum mobility within schools and between tracks 
improve the matching of pupils to their educational attainment and achievement. This can 
improve efficient learning and thus leads to high scores. However, we cannot fully explain 
the high scores of the Flemish pupils. A historical explanation may be that the successful 
20th-century struggle for survival of the Flemish language may have given the Flemish 
education a higher ethos and desire to outperform their Walloon co-patriots. 
 
7.2. Educational policy can make a difference 
Our analysis shows another very important result, with further implications than only for 
Dutch and Flemish policy makers. Despite our limitation to only countries, regions, Länder, 
or cantons with highly stratified systems, we still find significant effects of educational 
policies and arrangements on the educational performance of pupils. This means that policy 
makers do not need to first overhaul their educational system from a highly stratified one 
into a comprehensive one before they can improve the educational performance of their 
country. It also means that parents and teachers can more easily build coalitions between 
citizen and schools to improve their schools and that they do not need to wait until the 
educational system can be changed. 
 We briefly summarize which policies and arrangements within highly stratified 
system can make a difference. Some entrance selection by schools can be useful to 
strengthen their ambition and quality, which influence the performance of their pupils. The 
introduction of private dependent schools (in contrast with private independent schools) can 
increase a moderate form of competition between schools for pupils and thus improve 
teaching quality. The small size of secondary schools can be negatively related to 
educational performance, but building large “education factories” can also be harmful. 
Curricula and exit exams are important for the same function: setting standards for teachers 
and pupils regarding what to teach. Curricula seem to fulfill this function better than exams. 
First selection at the age of 12 instead of 10 increases the educational performance of all 
pupils. A vocational sector that is large enough to be vibrant and promote efficient teaching 
in preparation for the labor market improves the educational performance of all pupils, 
including those who do not attend vocational education. The related higher selectivity of 
schools offering medium and high curricula if they receive lower percentages of pupils due 
to the larger size of the vocational sector may avoid a watering down of the curriculum and a 
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slackening of standards. We do not find a trade-off between socioeconomic inequality and 
high educational performance within highly stratified systems, in contrast to Von Below 
(2002). 
 
7.3. Implications for the explanation of the differences in educational performance of the 
German Länder 
Although the intention of this paper is not to compare the educational systems of the German 
Länder, some conclusions about the effectiveness of their educational systems can be drawn 
from the analysis. It is the first sophisticated analysis of the effectiveness of highly stratified 
systems for the educational performance of native pupils.23 Of the 26 educational systems 
compared, 14 are part of the Bundes Republik Deutschland and the educational systems of 
the other non-German countries have many features in common with it. 
Some entrance selection by schools can be useful to strengthen their ambition and 
quality, which influence the performance of their pupils. Compared with low, medium, and 
high entrance selection average values of 21%, 49%, and 30%, respectively, the city-Länder 
have a remarkable low level of high entrance selection (9%) and the same holds for the 
northwestern Länder (15%). Given the positive effect of high entrance selection on math 
scores, these low levels of entrance selection may be detrimental for the educational 
performance of native pupils in these Länder. 
Private dependent schools (in contrast with private independent schools) can increase a 
moderate form of competition between schools for pupils and thus improve teaching quality. 
The average percentage of private dependent schools is 23%, and the Netherlands and 
Flanders are mainly responsible for this average. All German Länder have lower 
percentages, especially the northwestern and northeastern Länder. 
First selection at the age of 12 instead of 10 increases the educational performance of all 
pupils. All German Länder have 10 years as the age of first selection, which is quite early 
compared with the other countries with highly stratified systems. Increasing the age of 
selection by one year may increase the math scores of German native pupils by 11 points. 
A vocational sector that is large enough to be vibrant and promote efficient teaching in 
preparation for the labor market improves the educational performance of all pupils, 
including those who do not attend vocational education. The related higher selectivity of 
																																																								
23	The	only	available	comparison	between	the	German	Länder	(Köller,	Knigge	&	Tesch,	2010)	applies	descriptive	
tables	and	simple	OLS	regressions,	does	not	include	educational	system	characteristics	to	explain	cross‐Länder	
differences	and	does	not	distinguish	between	native	pupils	and	pupils	with	a	migrant	background.		
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schools offering medium and high curricula if they receive lower percentages of pupils due 
to the larger vocational sector may avoid watering down the curriculum and slackening 
standards. Although vocational education is often seen as a German institution, the size of 
the vocational sector in northeastern Länder (5%) is below the average (13%). 
Higher percentages of native pupils in schools increase the math scores of native pupils 
(10% more native pupils, 1.5 points higher). The city-Länder have a lower percentage of 
native pupils (74%) than other Länder, such as the northeastern Länder (96%) and 
southeastern Länder (91%), with an average percentage of 87% native pupils for all highly 
stratified systems compared. This variation in the percentage of native pupils means that the 
lower math score of the city-Länder (508) is an underestimation of the real quality of their 
educational organization, while the high math score of the southeastern Länder (535) 
overestimates the real quality of these Länder’ educational organization. 
One of the reasons for the ongoing stalemate in the German debates of educational 
policies is the assumed trade-off between socioeconomic inequality and high educational 
performance within highly stratified systems (Von Below (2002)). We do not find such a 
trade-off for the educational systems compared. The same holds for the German Länder, 
whose average socioeconomic gradient is 9.4; the gradient for the five combinations of 
German Länder is 8.1 for the northeastern Länder, 8.9 for the southeastern Länder, 11.1 for 
the city- and southwestern Länder, and 12.1 for the northwestern Länder. 
Unfortunately, discussing the policy implications for the German Länder in more detail 
is forbidden. But already the results show that a more transparent analysis of the differences 
in the educational performance of the Länder will enlighten the German public and can 
break the ongoing stalemate in German educational policy making through independent 
research. The remaining unexplained variance in the educational system levels shows that 
the added value of the education of the German Länder will be quite different and thus 
interesting for parents, teachers, and policy makers interested in a transparent state. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of all educational systems pooled together 
Variable No. of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Math score 48,786 529.73 86.93 150.09 1072.80
Parental ESCS 48,786 0.35 0.81 -3.68 3.20
Female 48,786 0.49 0.50 0 1
Grade 48,385 0.04 0.60 -2.74 2.87
Curriculum features   
Average school ESCS  48,786 0.30 0.44 -2.25 1.69
ESCS school diversity 48,786 0.64 0.08 0 0.78
% native pupils curriculum 48,786 86.88 14.30 4.55 100
Lower vocational curriculum 48,786 0.22 0.41 0 1
High curriculum 48,786 0.34 0.47 0 1
Low selection 48,786 0.21 0.41 0 1
High selection 48,786 0.30 0.46 0 1
Private gov. independent 48,786 0.01 0.10 0 1
Private gov. dependent 48,786 0.23 0.42 0 1
School size 48,786 655.99 397.07 15 3931
Rural area 48,786 0.39 0.49 0 1
City 48,786 0.21 0.41 0 1
Educational system features   
% lower vocational education 48,786 22.03 13.18 0 53.31
Age of selection 48,786 10.79 0.96 10 12
Exit exam 48,786 0.32 0.47 0 1
Socioeconomic gradient 48,786 9.44 4.58 0.57 25.05
Source: PISA 2006. The data for the Swiss cantons are from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(EDK), the data for the German Länder are from the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im 
Bildungswesen (IQB), and the data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of all variables for each of the educational systems 
 
  
Math 
Score 
Parental 
 ECSC 
Female Grade % Native 
 Pupils  
Average 
School 
 ESCS  
ESCS 
 School 
 Diversity 
Lower 
Vocational 
Curriculum  
High Curriculum 
Aargau 557.80 0.25 0.48 0.03 82.62 0.15 0.65 0.15 0.45 
  (79.84) (0.78) (0.50) (0.66) (14.72) (0.42) (0.09) (0.36) (0.50) 
Bern (German) 544.23 0.13 0.51 -0.13 90.28 0.09 0.62 0.34 0.24 
  (75.58) (0.82) (0.50) (0.57) (12.77) (0.46) (0.08) -(0.48) -(0.43) 
Basel-Landschaft 541.88 0.27 0.50 -0.02 84.58 0.21 0.63 0.27 0.34 
  (81.64) (0.77) (0.50) (0.61) (13.10) (0.40) (0.09) (0.44) (0.47) 
St. Gallen 564.38 0.09 0.49 0.00 81.13 0.02 0.66 0.30 0.15 
  (75.93) (0.83) (0.50) (0.66) (13.54) (0.39) (0.08) (0.46) (0.36) 
Schaffhausen 577.70 0.29 0.49 0.01 82.54 0.22 0.64 0.31 0.22 
  (84.78) (0.75) (0.50) (0.68) (13.49) (0.36) (0.09) (0.46) (0.41) 
Thurgau 560.47 0.09 0.49 -0.05 86.11 0.04 0.65 0.37 0.08 
  (75.15) (0.77) (0.50) (0.63) (12.79) (0.35) (0.07) (0.48) (0.28) 
Zurich 560.72 0.30 0.51 -0.10 78.47 0.19 0.62 0.30 0.26 
  (80.00) (0.77) (0.50) (0.61) (17.36) (0.43) (0.10) (0.46) (0.44) 
Wallis 551.64 0.06 0.49 0.01 89.23 0.02 0.63 0.30 0.43 
  (74.77) (0.74) (0.50) (0.43) (8.51) (0.31) (0.10) (0.46) (0.50) 
Southeastern German Länder 535.01 0.38 0.50 0.03 91.52 0.36 0.62 0.18 0.36 
 (80.30) (0.78) (0.50) (0.61) (8.71) (0.41) (0.08) (0.34) (0.48) 
German city-Länder 507.62 0.40 0.47 0.07 73.80 0.31 0.64 0.15 0.34 
 (91.08) (0.83) (0.50) (0.65) (17.31) (0.51) (0.08) (0.35) (0.47) 
Southwestern German Länder 524.42 0.50 0.51 0.06 81.60 0.44 0.62 0.23 0.36 
 (84.40) (0.78) (0.50) (0.60) (13.74) (0.43) (0.09) (0.42) (0.48) 
Northwestern German Länder 515.71 0.48 0.50 0.05 80.98 0.41 0.64 0.18 0.33 
 (84.36) (0.80) (0.50) (0.64) (12.89) (0.43) (0.07) (0.38) (0.47) 
Northeastern German Länder 509.69 0.32 0.48 0.01 96.49 0.32 0.63 0.05 0.34 
 (85.00) (0.79) (0.50) (0.66) (4.69) (0.39) (0.08) (0.17) (0.47) 
Austria 519.94 0.27 0.50 0.04 90.40 0.22 0.64 0.24 0.24 
  (86.63) (0.78) (0.50) (0.55) (10.57) (0.39) (0.07) (0.43) (0.43) 
Flanders 553.32 0.27 0.46 0.03 94.69 0.25 0.66 0.22 0.48 
  (89.47) (0.85) (0.50) (0.47) (8.95) (0.46) (0.08) (0.41) (0.50) 
Wallonia 518.95 0.27 0.49 0.09 85.84 0.24 0.66 0.15 0.59 
  (92.02) (0.86) (0.50) (0.59) (15.02) (0.47) (0.07) (0.36) (0.49) 
The Netherlands 544.90 0.38 0.49 0.03 91.34 0.32 0.67 0.53 0.24 
  (81.54) (0.82) (0.50) (0.56) (10.90) (0.40) (0.06) (0.50) (0.43) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 Low Selection 
High 
Selection 
Private 
 Government 
Independent 
Private 
Government 
Dependent 
School 
 Size 
School 
 in Rural 
 Area 
School 
 in the 
 City 
% Lower 
Vocational 
Education 
Age 
 of 
Selection 
Central 
 Exit Exam 
Socio 
 Economic 
 gradient 
Aargau 0.03 0.83 0.00 0.00 354.1 0.96 0.00 15.2 11.00 0 4.51 
  (0.16) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (179.5) (0.21) (0.00)     
Bern (German) 0.25 0.47 0.04 0.00 320.1 0.67 0.01 34.3 12.00 0 9.81 
  (0.44) (0.50) (0.19) (0.00) (216.5) -(0.47) -(0.30)     
Basel-Landschaft 0.09 0.61 0.00 0.00 586.5 0.79 0.00 26.5 11.00 0 9.91 
  (0.29) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (294.9) (0.41) (0.00)     
St. Gallen 0.23 0.51 0.00 0.00 353.7 0.72 0.00 30.3 12.00 0 6.94 
  (0.42) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (237.5) (0.45) (0.00)     
Schaffhausen 0.08 0.53 0.00 0.00 321.8 0.41 0.00 31.1 12.00 0 7.19 
  (0.27) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (240.3) (0.49) (0.00)     
Thurgau 0.24 0.38 0.00 0.01 254.4 0.89 0.00 36.6 12.00 0 9.34 
  (0.43) (0.49) (0.00) (0.09) (172.4) (0.31) (0.00)     
Zurich 0.19 0.43 0.00 0.05 409.0 0.51 0.21 29.7 12.00 0 3.57 
  (0.39) (0.50) (0.00) (0.22) (268.9) (0.50) (0.41)     
Wallis 0.35 0.40 0.00 0.00 795.3 0.69 0.00 30.3 12.00 0 6.81 
  (0.48) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (478.7) (0.46) (0.00)     
Southeastern German Länder 0.24 0.36 0.00 0.08 532.9 0.45 0.13 18.0 10.00 1 8.90 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.03) (0.26) (281.6) (0.50) (0.34)     
German city-Länder 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.17 627.7 0.01 0.88 15.0 10.67 0 11.11 
 (0.43) (0.29) (0.02) (0.37) (284.1) (0.05) (0.32)     
Southwestern German Länder 0.19 0.29 0.01 0.13 718.1 0.45 0.12 23.0 10.00 0.7 11.11 
 (0.38) (0.43) (0.07) (0.33) (304.0) (0.49) (0.32)     
Northwestern German Länder 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.10 786.3 0.38 0.18 18.0 10.00 0 12.08 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.08) (0.30) (390.4) (0.47) (0.37)     
Northeastern German Länder 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.08 497.7 0.45 0.12 5.0 10.00 0.7 8.14 
 (0.42) (0.41) 0.00 (0.27) (254.3) (0.50) (0.31)     
Austria 0.22 0.50 0.00 0.08 547.9 0.48 0.28 23.8 10.00 0 11.24 
  (0.41) (0.50) (0.00) (0.27) (415.1) (0.50) (0.45)     
Flanders 0.31 0.15 0.07 0.69 661.6 0.30 0.11  21.5 12.00 0 9.80 
  (0.46) (0.35) (0.25) (0.46) (298.2) (0.46) (0.31)     
Wallonia 0.37 0.06 0.02 0.59 796.5 0.29 0.21 15.1 12.00 0 3.88 
  (0.48) (0.24) (0.15) (0.49) (284.6) (0.46) (0.41)     
The Netherlands 0.01 0.55 0.00 0.69 1062.8 0.19 0.21 53.3 12.00 1.0 8.60 
  (0.11) (0.50) (0.00) (0.46) (538.1) (0.39) (0.41)     
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. The values for the five groups of German 
Länder are based on observed Länder averages, which we are not allowed to publish by contract with IQB. The southeastern German Länder are Sachsen, Thüringen, and Bavaria; the German city-Länder are 
Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin; the southwestern German Länder are Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Saarland; the northwestern German Länder are Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Niedersachsen, and 
Schleswig-Holstein; and the northeastern German Länder are Sachsen-Anholt, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
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Table 3: Average parental ESCS level by curriculum in each educational system 
 Low Medium High 
Aargau 0.27 0.37 0.52 
Bern (German) 0.08 0.26 0.37 
Basel-Landschaft -0.12 0.08 0.27 
St. Gallen 0.02 0.19 0.26 
Schaffhausen -0.07 0.31 0.73 
Thurgau -0.20 0.02 0.08 
Zurich -0.07 0.32 0.68 
Wallis -0.24 0.08 0.19 
Southeastern German Länder ‐0.18 0.23 0.80	
German city-Länder ‐0.23 0.21 0.94	
Southwestern German Länder 0.01 0.37 0.92	
Northwestern German Länder ‐0.11 0.36 0.96	
Northeastern German Länder ‐0.22 0.11 0.77	
Austria -0.02 0.15 0.84 
Flanders -0.33 0.13 0.64 
Wallonia -0.36 0.04 0.53 
The Netherlands 0.10 0.55 0.83 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the data for  
all the other countries are from the PISA website. The averages for the five groups of German Länder are based on observed 
Länder values, which we are not allowed to publish by contract with IQB. The southeastern German Länder are Sachsen, 
Thüringen, and Bavaria; the German city-Länder are Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin; the southwestern German Länder are 
Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Saarland; the northwestern German Länder are Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Niedersachsen, and Schleswig-Holstein; and the northeastern German Länder are Sachsen-Anholt; Brandenburg, and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
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Table 4: Coefficients for Flanders and the Netherlands in a series of multilevel analyses  
 Flanders Netherlands 
M1: no controls 40.9** (14.0) 50.1** (25.1) 
M2: controls for all individual characteristics 38.8** (14.2) 38.9 (24.6) 
M3: M2 & % natives, average school ESCS, ESCS school 
diversity 
34.6* (13.8) 18.5 (31.0) 
M4: M2 & entrance selection school 25.3 (15.5) 22.2 (15.5) 
M5: M2 & school size, school size squared 45.7 (24.3) 10.1 (39.9) 
M6: M2 & curriculum level 45.8* (20.8) 39.2 (34.9) 
M7: M2 & controls for all curriculum characteristics  41.7* (19.0) 22.1 (35.2) 
M8: M2 & central exit exams 40.1** (12.8) 29.3 (25.4) 
M9: M2 & age of selection 39.1** (14.5) 39.9 (25.7) 
M10: M2 & socioeconomic gradient 41.0** (14.4) 39.1 (24.7) 
M11: M2 & % lower vocational education 36.6* (14.3) 30.0 (24.5) 
M24: all individual, curriculum & system controls 56.2** (18.4) 14.5 (25.9) 
Source: See appendices II to V for full equations. 
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Table 5: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual, curriculum, and 
educational system levels), with Ni = 48385; Ns = 2816; Nes = 26; Nns = 5. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 7 Model 24 
Flanders 40.9** (14.0) 38.8** (14.2) 41.7* (19.0) 56.2** (18.4) 
The Netherlands 50.1* (25.1) 38.9 (24.6) 22.1 (35.2) 14.51 (25.9) 
Individual     
Parental ESCS   11.1*** (0.4) 7.2*** (0.4) 7.5*** (0.4) 
Female   -26.0*** (0.5) -27.5*** (0.6) -27.5*** (0.5) 
Grade   27.8*** (0.5) 24.7*** (0.5) 25.6*** (0.4) 
Curriculum     
Average school ESCS     26.0*** (2.0) 26.3*** (1.9) 
ESCS school diversity    10.9 (7.3) 7.5 (7.0) 
% Natives     0.15** (0.05) 0.15** (0.04) 
Lower vocational curriculum (ref. 
medium)   -57.6
*** (1.4) -56.8*** (1.4) 
High curriculum (ref. medium)    54.4*** (1.5) 55.0*** (1.4) 
Low selection (ref. medium selection)     -4.4** (1.5) -3.6** (1.4) 
High selection (ref. medium selection)     7.3*** (1.4) 7.8*** (1.3) 
Private gov. independent (ref. public)    -16.4** (5.3) -18.5*** (5.2) 
Private gov. dependent (ref. public)    8.3*** (1.7) 3.2* (1.5) 
School size    0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.00) 
School size squared    -0.00001
** 
(0.00) 
-0.00001** 
(0.00) 
Rural area (ref. town)     -8.9*** (1.7) 1.8 (1.3) 
City (ref. town)   0.1 (0.1) -6.8*** (1.6) 
Educational system     
Central exit exam    9.5 (6.4) 
Age of selection    11.1* (4.5) 
Socioeconomic gradient    -0.4 (0.6) 
% lower vocational education    1.13*** (0.29) 
      
Constant 509.2*** (11.2) 522.5*** (10.9) 489.5*** (18.0) 277.6*** (58.6) 
Variance components     
National state level 446.6*** (405.1) 425.0
*** 
(376.8) 
1029.7*** 
(861.9) 126.0
** (205.9) 
Educational system level 87.1*** (40.7) 95.9*** (41.0) 200.3*** (65.0) 130.4*** (48.7) 
Curriculum level 4131.8
*** 
(118.7) 
3214.3*** 
(94.9) 688.3
*** (26.1) 688.9*** (24.4) 
Individual level 3407.3*** (22.5) 2982.2
*** 
(19.8) 2817.3
*** (19.9) 2809.0*** (18.6) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from 
the IQB, and the data for all the other countries are from the PISA website.
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Appendix I: Definition of curriculum levels 
 
We classify the curricula into three different categories: 1) low for low vocational education; 2) medium for 
higher vocational education and lower general education, with no access to tertiary education; and 3) high 
for higher general education that gives direct access to tertiary education upon finishing high school. We use 
the original version of the so-called unique national study programme code from the PISA 2006 codebook. 
Table A1 illustrates the categorization of the curricula in each of the countries considered. 
 
Table A1: curriculum level per country. 
Country/ 
curriculum 
Low  Medium  High  
Austria 
Vocational  program 
Middle vocational school 
Vocational college 
Lower secondary school 
Upper secondary school 
Apprenticeship 
Higher vocational school 
Gymnasium lower 
secondary 
Gymnasium upper 
secondary 
Belgium 
Second year of first stage— 
preparing for vocational 
secondary education 
2nd & 3rd vocational 
secondary education 
Part-time vocational 
secondary education focused 
on the labor markets 
2nd year of vocational 
education (French/German) 
Complementary year to first 
degree (French community 
only) 
2nd & 3rd degrees of 
vocational education 
(FR/GER) 
Vocational training focused on 
the labor market (FR com 
only) 
Special sec. educ. (lower 
sec. - training form 3) 
(Wallonia only) 
Special sec. educ. (lower 
sec.) (GER only) 
Second- & third-stage 
technical secondary 
education 
Special sec. educ. - upper 
sec. (training form 3 / years 
4 and 5) 
2nd & 3rd degrees of techn. 
or art. educ. (transition) 
(FR/GER) 
2nd & 3rd degrees of techn. 
or art. Educ. (qualif.) 
(FR/GER) 
Special sec. Educ. (upper 
sec.-training form 3) (FR 
only) 
(First year a of first stage 
of) general education 
Second year of first stage 
preparing for regular sec. 
educ. 
Second & third stage 
regular secondary 
education 
First degree of general 
education (FR/GER) 
Second & third degrees 
of general education 
(FR/GER) 
Germany 
Lower sec., no access to 
upper secondary 
(Hauptschule) 
Lower sec., no access to 
upper sec. (koop. 
Gesamtschule Hauptschule) 
Lower sec., no access to 
upper secondary 
(Hauptschule integrated) 
Lower sec., no access to 
upper secondary 
(Hauptschulklasse) 
Pre-vocational training year 
Lower secondary with access 
to upper secondary 
(comprehensive) 
Lower sec., no access to 
upper secondary (Realschule) 
Comprehensive lower sec. 
with access to upper sec. 
(Gesamtschule) 
Lower sec., with or without 
access to upper sec. (koop. 
Gesamtschules, Realschule) 
Lower sec., no access to 
upper secondary (Realschule 
Lower sec. With access 
to upper secondary 
(Gymnasium) 
Upper sec. Level 
(Gymnasium) 
Lower sec., with access 
to upper sec. (Koop. Gs, 
Gymn.) 
Lower secondary with 
access to upper 
secondary (Waldorf) 
Upper secondary level of 
education (Waldorf) 
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Vocational school 
(Berufsfachschule) 
integrated) 
Lower sec., no access to 
upper secondary 
(Realschulklasse) 
Vocational school 
(Berufsschule) 
 
The 
Netherlands 
Practical preparation for 
labor market 
Vmbo (general voc.) 
Vmbo bb (1-2 year) 
Vmbo bb (3-4 year) 
Vmbo kb (1-2 year) 
Vmbo kb (3-4 year) 
Vmbo gl/ tl (1-2 year) 
Vmbo gl/ tl (3-4 year) 
Havo (year 1-3) 
Havo (sec. year 4-5) 
Vwo (year 1-3) 
Vwo (year 4-6) 
 
Switzerland 
24(German 
cantons) 
 
Basic requirements 
Heterogeneous basic 
requirements 
 
Intermediate requirements 
Heterogeneous intermediate 
requirements 
 
 
Higher requirements 
Heterogeneous higher 
requirements 
Source: PISA 2006 codebook. 
 
 
   
																																																								
24	Pupils are allocated to institutionally separate school types, according to their performance levels. The structure is based on the 
principle of equal capacities among pupils. Generally, each school type has its own adapted curricula, teaching material, and 
teachers and, in some cases, its own range of subjects. In general, there are two to three school types (four in a minority of 
cantons), whose names vary. In the structure with two school types, a distinction is made between the performance-based group at 
the basic level (with the least demanding requirements) and the performance-based group at the advanced level. In the structure 
with three school types, there is a performance-based group at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels. The requirements of 
the performance-based group at the advanced level are the most demanding and this school type generally prepares pupils for 
transfer to the Matura schools.	
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Appendix II: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual and 
curriculum controls), with Ni = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Flanders 40.92** 38.78** 34.61* 25.27 45.67 45.80* 41.73* 
  (14.030) (14.210) (13.760) (15.470) (24.310) (20.800) (19.040) 
Netherland
s 50.06
* 38.93 18.49 22.24 10.06 39.15 22.07 
  (25.060) (24.550) (31.010) (15.520) (39.890) (34.940) (35.200) 
Individual 
level        
Parental 
ESCS   11.09
*** 9.233*** 10.80*** 10.38*** 8.260*** 7.247*** 
    (0.362) (0.365) (0.362) (0.360) (0.353) (0.379) 
Female   -26.01*** -26.21*** -26.28*** -25.93
*** -27.58*** -27.52*** 
   (0.534) (0.531) (0.532) (0.529) (0.515) (0.551) 
Grade   27.82*** 27.50*** 27.68*** 27.23*** 25.81*** 24.68*** 
    (0.458) (0.455) (0.456) (0.454) (0.441) (0.474) 
Curriculum         
% natives      0.114*       0.153** 
      (0.051)       (0.047) 
Average 
school 
ESCS  
    95.57***       25.96*** 
      (1.855)       (1.966) 
ESCS 
school 
diversity 
    45.43***       10.91 
      (8.819)       (7.296) 
Low 
selection       
-
20.82***     -4.404
** 
 (ref. 
medium 
selection) 
      (2.147)     (1.464) 
High 
selection       31.49
***     7.332*** 
 (ref. 
medium 
selection) 
      (1.939)     (1.388) 
School size         0.170***   0.0256*** 
          (0.006)   (0.005) 
School size 
squared         
-
0.0000575**
* 
  
-
0.00000704*
* 
          (0.000)   (0.000) 
Lower 
vocational 
curriculum 
          -67.90*** -57.55*** 
 (ref. 
medium)           (1.322) (1.444) 
High           68.89*** 54.35*** 
  35
curriculum 
 (ref. 
medium)           (1.265) (1.473) 
Private gov. 
indep.             -16.36
** 
 (ref. 
public)             (5.349) 
Private gov. 
dep.              8.303
*** 
 (ref. 
public)             (1.701) 
City             -8.878*** 
 (ref. town)             (1.703) 
Rural        0.124 
(ref. town)       (0.09) 
Constant 509.2*** 522.5*** 472.1*** 521.4*** 452.8*** 527.0*** 489.5*** 
  (11.170) (10.930) (16.230) (3.309) (19.090) (16.270) (18.030) 
Variance 
component
s 
       
National 
state level 446.6
*** 425.0*** 797.9*** x 1325.6*** 967.3*** 1029.7*** 
  (405.100) 
(376.800
) 
(649.200
)  (1140.100) 
(835.500
) (861.900) 
Educational 
system 
level 
87.07*** 95.94*** 93.96*** 223.9*** 338.6*** 247.1*** 200.3*** 
  (40.740) (40.980) (34.290) (77.220) (114.300) (78.960) (64.990) 
Curriculum 
level 
4131.8**
* 
3214.3**
* 
1264.1**
* 
2995.9**
* 2630.9
*** 820.1*** 688.3*** 
  (118.700) (94.890) (40.980) (89.080) (79.010) (27.910) (26.140) 
Individual 
level 
3407.3**
* 
2982.2**
* 
2983.0**
* 
2964.4**
* 2935.5
*** 2815.7
**
* 2817.3
*** 
  (22.480) (19.770) (19.770) (19.650) (19.460) (18.640) (19.900) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from 
the IQB, and all the data for the other countries are from the PISA website. Here the x = four-level 
model did not converge, so the three-level model is used.  
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Appendix III: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual and 
educational system controls), with Ni = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Netherlands 29.27 39.86 39.09 29.98 
  (25.440) (25.680) (24.740) (24.470) 
Flanders 40.14** 39.11** 41.03** 36.61* 
  (12.810) (14.540) (14.410) (14.290) 
Individual level     
Parental ESCS 11.10*** 11.09*** 11.09*** 11.09*** 
  (0.362) (0.362) (0.362) (0.362) 
Female -26.01*** -26.01*** -26.01*** -26.01*** 
  (0.534) (0.534) (0.534) (0.534) 
Grade 27.82*** 27.82*** 27.82*** 27.82*** 
  (0.458) (0.458) (0.458) (0.458) 
Educational system     
Central exit exam 12.34*       
  (5.234)       
Age of selection   -0.89     
    (4.796)     
Socioeconomic gradient     -0.446   
      (0.491)   
% lower vocational education       0.291 
        (0.278) 
Constant 520.6*** 532.2*** 526.1*** 516.4*** 
  (11.340) (53.850) (11.760) (11.770) 
Variance components     
National state level 471.9*** 455.8*** 434.3*** 355.4*** 
  (404.400) (406.200) (387.500) (330.200) 
Educational system level 72.11*** 100.7*** 95.80*** 98.13*** 
  (34.230) (43.340) (42.300) (42.640) 
Curriculum level 3213.3*** 3214.4*** 3214.4*** 3214.3*** 
  (94.860) (94.900) (94.900) (94.900) 
Individual level 2982.3*** 2982.2*** 2982.2*** 2982.2*** 
  (19.770) (19.770) (19.770) (19.770) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from 
the IQB, and the data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. 
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Appendix IV: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual, entrance 
selection, and educational system controls), with Ni  = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Netherlands 24.06 8.533 21.63 -6.702 
  -(16.670) -(13.590) -(15.210) -(15.480) 
Flanders 24.61 11.56 25.72 23.74 
 -(15.940) -(13.540) -(15.160) -(12.840) 
Individual level     
Parental ESCS 10.80*** 10.81*** 10.80*** 10.80*** 
  -(0.362) -(0.362) -(0.362) -(0.362) 
Female -26.28*** -26.28*** -26.28*** -26.28*** 
  -(0.532) -(0.532) -(0.532) -(0.532) 
Grade 27.68*** 27.68*** 27.68*** 27.68*** 
  -(0.456) -(0.456) -(0.456) -(0.456) 
Educational system     
Central exit exam -2.557       
  -(7.296)       
Age of selection   10.33***     
    -(3.021)     
Socioeconomic gradient     -0.911   
      -(0.630)   
% lower vocational education       0.884*** 
        -(0.263) 
School     
Low selection -20.81*** -20.91*** -20.90*** -20.85*** 
(ref. medium selection)  -(2.147) -(2.145) -(2.147) -(2.145) 
High selection 31.47*** 31.44*** 31.42*** 31.42*** 
 (ref. medium selection)  -(1.939) -(1.936) -(1.940) -(1.937) 
Constant 522.2*** 411.3*** 529.9*** 503.7*** 
  -(3.922) -(32.270) -(6.710) -(5.923) 
Variance components     
National state level x x x x 
      
Educational system level 235.2*** 150.4*** 213.9*** 147.5*** 
  -(81.890) -(53.750) -(75.670) -(54.680) 
Curriculum/school level 2995.7*** 2993.2*** 2995.6*** 2994.9*** 
  -(89.070) -(88.950) -(89.060) -(89.020) 
Individual level 2964.4*** 2964.4*** 2964.4*** 2964.4*** 
  -(19.650) -(19.650) -(19.650) -(19.650) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from 
the IQB, and the data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. The x = four-level 
model did not converge, so the three-level model is used. 
	
Appendix V: Multilevel analysis of determinants of math scores (individual, curriculum, 
school, and educational system controls), with Ni  = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 16 
Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
Model 
20 
Model 
21 
Model 
22 
Model 
23 Model 24
Netherlan
ds 10.22 14.46 18.54 9.897 29.31 35.97 39.17 8.815 14.51 
  (32.050) 
(30.17
0) 
(30.99
0) 
(30.50
0) 
(35.96
0) 
(35.49
0) 
(35.18
0) 
(29.87
0) (25.900) 
Flanders 35.18** 33.91* 35.79* 32.83* 47.21* 44.82* 48.26* 40.31* 56.17** 
  (12.300) 
(13.97
0) 
(14.22
0) 
(13.78
0) 
(19.92
0) 
(21.17
0) 
(21.20
0) 
(17.01
0) (18.390) 
Individual          
Parental 
ESCS 
9.232**
* 
9.233**
* 
9.233**
* 
9.233**
* 
8.262**
* 
8.260**
* 
8.260**
* 
8.256**
* 7.454
*** 
  (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.353) (0.353) (0.353) (0.353) (0.355) 
Female 
-
26.21**
* 
-
26.20**
* 
-
26.20**
* 
-
26.21**
* 
-
27.58**
* 
-
27.58**
* 
-
27.58**
* 
-
27.58**
* 
-27.53*** 
  (0.531) (0.531) (0.531) (0.531) (0.515) (0.515) (0.515) (0.515) (0.514) 
Grade 27.51
**
* 
27.50**
* 
27.50**
* 
27.50**
* 
25.81**
* 
25.81**
* 
25.81**
* 
25.81**
* 25.58
*** 
  (0.455) (0.455) (0.455) (0.455) (0.441) (0.441) (0.441) (0.441) (0.440) 
Curriculu
m          
Average 
school 
ESCS  
95.72**
* 
95.59**
* 
95.58**
* 
95.49**
*         26.28
*** 
  (1.854) (1.855) (1.855) (1.856)         (1.862) 
ESCS 
school 
diversity 
45.55**
* 
45.41**
* 
45.44**
* 
45.57**
*         7.529 
  (8.816) (8.820) (8.820) (8.820)         (6.964) 
% natives  0.101 0.115* 0.114* 0.119*         0.146** 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)         (0.044) 
Lower 
vocational 
curriculum 
        
-
67.90**
* 
-
67.91**
* 
-
67.92**
* 
-
68.04**
* 
-56.84*** 
 (ref. 
medium)         (1.322) (1.322) (1.322) (1.323) (1.375) 
High 
curriculum         
68.87**
* 
68.89**
* 
68.88**
* 
68.84**
* 54.96
*** 
 (ref. 
medium)         (1.265) (1.265) (1.265) (1.265) (1.409) 
Low 
selection                 -3.647
** 
(ref. 
medium 
selection)  
                (1.383) 
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High 
selection                 7.791
*** 
(ref. 
medium 
selection)  
                (1.329) 
Private 
gov. 
independe
nt 
                -18.49*** 
(ref. 
public)                 (5.163) 
Private 
gov. 
dependent 
                3.155* 
(ref. 
public)                 (1.519) 
School size                 0.0249*** 
                 (0.004) 
School size 
squared                 
-
0.000006
20** 
                  (0.000) 
Rural area                 1.814 
(ref. town)                 (1.313) 
City                 -6.837*** 
(ref. town)                 (1.563) 
Education
al system          
Central 
exit exam 11.41
*       13.65       9.455 
  (4.753)       (7.646)       (6.408) 
Age of 
selection   4.011       3.654     11.11
* 
    (4.485)       (6.653)     (4.526) 
Socioecon
omic 
gradient 
    -0.231       -0.528   -0.42 
      (0.456)       (0.688)   (0.583) 
% lower 
vocational 
education 
      0.288       1.162
**
* 1.139
*** 
        (0.252)       (0.309) (0.288) 
Constant 471.4
**
* 
428.1**
* 
474.1**
* 
465.4**
* 
524.8**
* 
486.9**
* 
531.5**
* 
501.3**
* 277.6
*** 
  (16.690) 
(51.78
0) 
(16.65
0) 
(16.67
0) 
(16.75
0) 
(74.97
0) 
(17.37
0) 
(14.55
0) (58.600) 
Variance 
component
s 
         
  3
National 
state level 
873.9**
* 
723.0**
* 
793.0**
* 
711.7**
* 
1040.0
*** 
967.0**
* 
983.4**
* 
596.1**
* 126.0
** 
  (705.800) 
(604.6
00) 
(646.7
00) 
(589.1
00) 
(875.4
00) 
(854.3
00) 
(855.1
00) 
(533.4
00) (205.900)
Educationa
l system 
level 
72.00**
* 
97.53**
* 
98.06**
* 
93.57**
* 
222.1**
* 
256.5**
* 
251.2**
* 
158.9**
* 130.4
*** 
  (28.640) 
(35.88
0) 
(36.39
0) 
(35.00
0) 
(73.25
0) 
(83.33
0) 
(82.25
0) 
(54.23
0) (48.650) 
Curriculu
m level 
1263.9
*** 
1264.1
*** 
1264.1
*** 
1264.1
*** 
820.3**
* 
820.1**
* 
820.1**
* 
820.1**
* 688.9
*** 
  (40.970) 
(40.98
0) 
(40.98
0) 
(40.98
0) 
(27.91
0) 
(27.90
0) 
(27.91
0) 
(27.91
0) (24.350) 
Individual 
level 
2983.0
*** 
2982.9
*** 
2983.0
*** 
2983.0
*** 
2815.6
*** 
2815.7
*** 
2815.7
*** 
2815.7
*** 2809.0
*** 
  (19.770) 
(19.77
0) 
(19.77
0) 
(19.77
0) 
(18.64
0) 
(18.64
0) 
(18.64
0) 
(18.64
0) (18.600) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from 
the IQB, and the data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. 
	
	
